The Idea of a Democratic Zone of Peace:
Origins in the Enlightenment
Mark E. Pietrzyk, Ph.D.
One of the most popular ideas in contemporary international relations theory is the notion that "democracies do not go to war with one another."1 It is claimed that while democracies may fight frequent wars with non-democracies, democratic states form a separate "zone of peace" with each other, and that as democracy spreads, this zone of peace will also spread, until it one day covers the globe.2
The reigning consensus among political scientists is that this idea can be traced back to the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, who proposed the creation of an international federation of republics in his 1795 essay Perpetual Peace.3 Attribution of this idea to Kant, however, is somewhat peculiar, insofar as Kant's essay was not particularly original. In fact, the main themes of Kant's essay had long been popular topics of Enlightenment thought. Both the ideas of international federation and the peaceable nature of republics were well-known to educated people of the eighteenth century, and were discussed and debated by thinkers and statesmen for many years before Kant composed his essay.
Moreover, while it is true that Kant's essay called for the creation of a federation of republics to maintain global peace, the claim that Kant is the originator of the idea that "democracies do not go to war with one another," is a distortion of what Kant actually wrote. In fact, Kant's actual views of what makes a peaceful government and the consequences of this for international politics, were significantly different from what contemporary interpreters of Kant claim.
So why has Kant been seized upon as a prophet of democratic peace, and why has his peace plan been subject to
distortion by contemporary scholars? The reasons for this may lie in the unfortunate experiences of previous proponents
of the democratic zone of peace idea. In many respects, the idea of a federation of republics to maintain peace was
discredited by events of the later eighteenth century, but Kant's essay was written in such an ambiguous manner as to be
suitable for a creative re-interpretation later. How this came to be is the subject of this study.
Peace Plans Before Kant
The idea of a democratic zone of peace originated in two conceptions which evolved separately but were later brought together in the late eighteenth century: the idea of international federation and the idea of the peaceable nature of republics.4 The first idea is much older than the latter.
Ironically, the first peace plans calling for international federation were inspired by the military alliances which states created to fight wars. Out of these temporary alliances arose the idea of a federation designed to end war altogether by presenting potential aggressors with a united front. As early as 1306, Pierre Dubois, an advisor to French King Philip le Bel, wrote a tract entitled De Recuperatione Terre Sancte (Of the Restoration of the Holy Land). Although the stated purpose of Dubois' plan was a European crusade to recover the Holy Land, Dubois also viewed the establishment of a peaceful European union as a necessary precondition to reach this goal. Dubois proposed the formation of a council of Christian nations to arbitrate disputes in Europe, with France as the dominant member of the federation.5 Subsequently, the creation of an international federation was seen as a worthy goal in itself, and later peace plans revolved around the idea of federation.6
One of the most famous of these plans was the so-called "Grand Design" of King Henry IV of France (1638). Modern scholars have dismissed the plan as a fraudulent creation of the king's advisor Sully, who discussed the plan in memoirs he composed after the king's death. Nevertheless, widespread belief in the authenticity of the plan gave the "Grand Design" a prominent place in the history of peace plans. Like previous plans, the "Grand Design" called for the creation of a council of powers in Europe to settle disputes; unlike previous peace plans, the attribution of this design to a powerful French king gave the plan a credibility it would not otherwise have had.7
The "Grand Design" subsequently served as an inspiration to additional peace plans, one of which was composed by the English Quaker William Penn. Penn's "Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe" (1693) proposed the creation of a parliament of European princes to settle outstanding differences, with representation based on the territorial value of each state. Penn proposed that a three-quarters vote would be necessary for decisions and that any disobedient states be compelled by the combined power of the other states.8
The publication of these blueprints for world peace had little effect in stopping or preventing the various religious wars and wars of succession which swept across Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However, a new hope arose in 1713 when, after a half-century of wars sparked by the ambitions of the French monarch Louis XIV, the Treaty of Utrecht was signed, promising a "Christian universal peace" between the nations of Europe.
At the Utrecht peace conference was one Abbé de Saint-Pierre, a secretary to the French delegation. An inveterate liberal reformer, Saint-Pierre had been working for years on a peace plan that would go beyond traditional diplomacy and unite all of Europe in a single federation. His "Project for a Perpetual Peace" was published anonymously in 1713 and distributed to the delegates at Utrecht. Subsequently, the "Project for Perpetual Peace" became widely known.
The Abbé's plan called for the creation of a European "Senate for Peace" to be stationed permanently at Utrecht. Contributions from the various states would be used to create a single international army, which would have the power to put down disturbances between or within states. The Senate would ensure the political and territorial status quo in Europe, although territorial changes could be made with the approval of three-quarters of the Senate.9
Unfortunately, the Abbé was an extremely poor writer, and his project -- in two volumes totaling 728 pages -- was read by few in its entirety. However, a young friend of the Abbé, Jean Jacques Rousseau, offered to edit the project shortly after the Abbé's death. Rousseau reduced the turgid two volume work to a short précis, which was published in 1761.10
Rousseau's edited and revised version of "Perpetual Peace," besides being much easier to read, consisted of several new ideas. Rousseau hinted in the text that one of the problems with the Abbé's original plan was that it did not take into account the tendency of absolute monarchs to aggrandize against their own people and others.11 Rousseau did not elaborate on this problem (or possible solutions) for fear of offending powerful authorities. However, in a private addendum, not published until 1784, six years after Rousseau's death, Rousseau made explicit the connection between the tyrannical rule of monarchs and military imperialism: "All the business of kings or of those to whom they delegate their duties, is concerned with two objects alone; to extend their rule abroad or to make it more absolute at home. . . ."12
However, Rousseau did not go so far as to make a case for republicanism as a possible solution to the problem of war. He felt that it was impossible to establish a true republic on any piece of territory larger than a city; moreover, he wrote that republics could not always be expected to remain peaceful unless they were economically self-sufficient and had no need to interact with the outside world.13
It was thanks to the Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Rousseau that the idea of peace-through-federation became a popular notion of the Enlightenment. Indeed, the very phrase "perpetual peace" became so fashionable after the publication of Pierre's project that no less than six other such peace plans appeared in the next century with "perpetual peace" in the title.14 By the late eighteenth century, certain skeptics were employing the phrase "perpetual peace" in their writings with a distinct tone of sarcasm.15
At about the same time as St. Pierre's work was being popularized, the idea of the peaceable nature of republics was also beginning to make its way into the public consciousness. In 1748, the French philosophe Montesquieu argued in his classic Spirit of the Laws that "The spirit of monarchy is war and enlargement of dominion: peace and moderation are the spirit of a republic."16 Montesquieu's work and his insights on the differences between monarchies and republics subsequently became widely influential.
In 1776, the American revolutionary pamphleteer Thomas Paine criticized monarchical institutions for their domestic tyranny and international aggression in his pamphlet Common Sense. Paine followed Montesquieu in arguing that republics provided a better example of peaceful behavior: "[P]erfect equality affords no temptation. The republics of Europe are all (and we may say always) in peace. Holland and Switzerland are without wars, foreign or domestic."17 Common Sense subsequently became a huge bestseller in America, and Paine was credited with galvanizing American public opinion firmly in favor of revolution against Great Britain.18
The American Founding as a Test Case
Throughout America's war of independence (1775-1783), the separate states were governed loosely under a confederate structure. In fact, America's first constitution, the Articles of Confederation, was perceived as being roughly equivalent to the league of nations which was proposed in the Grand Design of Henry IV.19 The necessity for unity against the British during the Revolutionary War inspired a minimal level of cooperation among the American states, even if urgent requests for soldiers and funding often went unfulfilled. However, there were fears that once the British were expelled, the separate American states would conflict with one another, perhaps violently.20
Not long after America's achievement of independence in 1783, a number of incidents lent credibility to these concerns. In foreign relations, the American states proved unwilling and/or unable to abide by treaties negotiated and signed by the Congress. The result was a dangerously disjointed foreign policy which threatened to tear apart the confederacy. The state of Georgia ignored Congress and negotiated an illegal settlement with Spain over the boundaries of Spanish-occupied America. Many states negotiated their own loans from foreign countries. In their relations with the Indian tribes, the states overlooked treaty violations by citizens trespassing upon Indian territory and refused to grant full diplomatic authority to Congress. Most important of all, the peace settlement between America and Great Britain was put into jeopardy by violations of the treaty by the states.21
The territories west of the thirteen states were subject to conflicting claims between the states on the basis of old colonial charters, different treaties with the Indians and foreign powers, the acquisitions of private investors, and the unauthorized actions of roving bands of settlers. Secessionist movements arose, plotting the separation of the western portions of Virginia and North Carolina, and the creation of a new state from portions of Kentucky and Tennessee. North Carolina was finally able to regain its territory from secessionists, but only after several violent incidents.22 Most such territorial disputes were resolved peacefully, but there was a growing uneasiness about the frequency of these disputes and whether they would always be amenable to peaceful settlement under the confederation.23 At the same time, a number of states were adopting different international trade policies, sometimes discriminating against other American states and even engaging in trade wars with one another.24
A potentially explosive issue was the possibility of separate alliances of American states and settler groups with foreign powers. Americans finding themselves on different sides in a diplomatic dispute between European alliances might eventually find themselves at war with each other. This possibility arose in 1784, when a serious diplomatic crisis arose between America and Spain. A heated debate in Congress followed, with seven northern states, unwilling to go to war, urging concession to Spain, and five southern states adamantly opposing concession. Anger over the issue grew to the point that it became popular to talk about the break-up of the union into two or more confederations, each pursuing different foreign policies, or even contracting alliances with different European powers.25 In fact, a number of leading figures among the Western settlers, unable to gain the protection or support of their fellow Americans, seriously considered pledging their loyalty to Spain or allying with Britain against Spain.26
The performance of the confederacy in reacting to the debtors' insurrection in Massachusetts known as Shay's rebellion (1786-87) was little better. The Massachusetts state militia melted away in the face of the rebellion, and the state government was forced to raise a private army to finally defeat Shay's forces.27 When the governor of Massachusetts requested the aid of other states in capturing the remnants of Shay's army, which had fled to other states, Vermont and Rhode Island, out of sympathy and/or fear of the rebels, refused the governor's request. In fact, there were violent debtors' protests in a number of different states, though not as severe as in Massachusetts, and a number of observers raised the possibility that insurgents in the various states might join forces and begin a civil war stretching across the continent.28
The winter of 1786-87 marked a period in which various disturbances arising out of the lack of union seemed to culminate in a single ominous trend: insurrections among indebted farmers crossing state borders, conflict among the states and Western separatists over policy towards Spain, trade conflicts between the states, and calls for splitting up the union into two or three confederacies.29 George Washington himself had written a letter to James Madison arguing that America was "fast verging on anarchy. . . Thirteen sovereignties pulling against each other, and all tugging at the foederal head, will soon bring ruin on the whole."30 The Congress had previously made plans to hold a convention in May 1787 to discuss the possibility of a common commercial policy among the states "and other important matters." But news of these disturbances convinced many that the agenda of the convention should go well beyond mundane matters of commercial regulation.31
When May arrived, and the delegates met in Philadelphia, there was serious talk of the possibility of war and the resulting destruction of America's republican institutions. James Madison warned that "the same causes which have rendered the old world the Theater of incessant wars, & have banished liberty from the face of it, [will] soon produce the same effects here" if a more effective American union was not obtained.32 Virginia governor Edmund Randolph declared in his opening address to the delegates that a stronger union was necessary to restrain the "dogs of war."33
These predictions of war did not usually specify which type of war was inevitable: war between two or more American
states, war between separate confederacies of American states, war between American states and a foreign power, civil
war between state governments and insurrectionists, or some combination of the above. The fact of the matter was that
under the circumstances, any one of these types of wars, or combination of wars, was feared as a possibility.
Debate Between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists
The Constitution which finally emerged from the convention promised a much stronger American union, effectively ending the sovereignty of the separate states in most respects. When the Constitution was presented to the states for ratification, Madison, along with Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, presented their case for a stronger union in what later came to be called The Federalist Papers.
A major issue discussed in the subsequent debates between the "Federalists" and the proponents of looser union known as the "Anti-Federalists" was whether the Constitution was necessary to prevent the possibility of war between the American states. In general, the anti-Federalists felt that the possibility of war was exaggerated, while the Federalists saw war as a significant danger.
Alexander Hamilton was well aware of the popularity of the view that republics were inherently peaceful, and felt that the Federalists needed to discredit the idea if they were to make the case for the Constitution. In one essay, Hamilton argued:
[T]here are still to be found visionary or designing men, who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace between the [American] States, though dismembered and alienated from each other. The genius of republics (say they) is pacific. . . .
[However,] are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions that affect nations as well as kings? Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities? . . . Let experience, the least fallible guide of human opinions, be appealed to for an answer to these inquiries.34
Hamilton pointed out that Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were republics and that Athens and Carthage were commercial republics, but that did not stop them from fighting numerous wars, defensive and offensive, against other states, including fellow republics. Historically, argued Hamilton, "There have been . . . almost as many popular as royal wars."35 Hamilton warned that without the new Constitution, divisions between the American states would ultimately result in a recreation of the war-like conditions of the European continent, with all of its negative consequences for freedom.36
Several of the Federalists agreed that republics would be somewhat less likely to go to war than monarchies. John Jay and James Madison drew a distinction between wars fought by governments and wars fought by societies or nations. An absolute monarch, being unanswerable to his people, frequently launched wars for vain or petty reasons to the detriment of his nation; the institution of republicanism would help subordinate government to the interests of the people, and thereby solve this problem. However, the Federalists argued that the second type of war, that between societies, was less susceptible to a permanent solution.37
The anti-Federalists countered that the Federalists' warnings were exaggerated, and dismissed the possibility of war between the American states if the Constitution was not ratified. Virginia delegate William Grayson argued,
We are now told . . . that we shall have wars and rumors of wars, that every calamity is to attend us, and that we shall be ruined and disunited forever, unless we adopt this Constitution. . . . These, sir, are the mighty dangers which await us if we reject -- dangers which are merely imaginary, and ludicrous in the extreme! Are we [Virginians] to be destroyed by Maryland and Pennsylvania? What will democratic states make war for, and how long since have they imbibed a hostile spirit?38
A number of anti-Federalists pointed to Switzerland as proof of the notion that a free confederacy of republics would always remain at peace.39
Even so, anti-Federalist opinion was not unanimous about the certainty of "perpetual peace" between democratic states under a confederacy. In the view of some, there might indeed be a greater possibility of war under a loose confederacy; but it was better to run this risk rather than run the risk of instituting a single, hegemonic tyranny. Argued one anonymous essayist,
[F]or the sake of argument, [let us] admit that the necessary consequence of rejecting or delaying the establishment of the new constitution would be the dissolution of the union, and the institution of even rival and inimical republics; yet ought such an apprehension, if well founded, to drive us into the fangs of despotism? Infinitely preferable would be occasional wars to such an event.40
Likewise, a prominent anti-Federalist in Maryland, attempting to refute Hamilton's argument about the dangers to liberty resulting from a multi-state system, claimed that the European state system, far from causing despotism, in fact preserved a degree of liberty which would otherwise be extinguished if Europe was under a single government.41
One prominent anti-Federalist, Luther Martin, a respected lawyer and attorney general of Maryland, argued that warfare among the American states might occasionally be necessary to defend freedom:
By the principles of the American revolution, arbitrary power may and ought to be resisted even by arms if necessary -- The time may come when it shall be the duty of a State, in order to preserve itself from the oppression of the general government, to have recourse to the sword. . . .42
Martin complained that the Constitution declared such behavior to be acts of treason, and proposed that the Constitution be amended so that acts of war committed by states against the union be regarded not as "treason" but as being regulated by "the laws of war and of nations."43
Overall, the anti-Federalists did agree that a stronger union was necessary, but felt that the new Federal Constitution went
too far. The problem with the anti-Federalist position was that, as one scholar of anti-Federalist thought put it,
"the Anti-Federalists could neither fully reject nor fully accept the leading
principles of the Constitution."44 It was widely
accepted that the Articles of Confederation were insufficient in securing the union and that a strengthening of the
confederacy was necessary.45 However, no one could think of a way to create a strong federal association that did not
somehow supercede the sovereignty of the separate states.
The Federalists ultimately won the debate, in the sense that they succeeded in having the Constitution ratified by
two-thirds of the states (albeit with the addition of a bill of rights demanded by the anti-Federalists). Still, the fact that the
Federalists won the debate in the arena of American public opinion hardly constitutes in itself a decisive refutation of the
claim that separate American republics could have existed alongside each other peacefully. After all, although the
American states did have sharp disputes with one another under the Articles of Confederation, these did not escalate into
inter-state war. In that sense, the notion of peaceable republics was not disproved. Even many of the Federalist thinkers
who argued that national union was necessary to prevent the possibility of war admitted that republics were at least less
likely to go to war than monarchies, even if they could not be counted on to be peaceful always.46 Thus, hope for the
pacifying effects of republican governments on international politics remained.
Impact of the French Revolution
Although both ideas of international federation and republicanism were popular in the years leading up to 1789, no one had explicitly proposed a world-wide federation composed solely of republics as the path to international peace. The reasons for this were probably two: First, there were not nearly enough republics in existence at the time to believe that a federation of republics could really have an impact on international politics. Any kind of workable international federation would have to have at least a few great powers as members -- but all the existing great powers happened to be monarchies. Second, many still believed in Montesquieu's rule that it was impossible to build a republic on a territory larger than a city-state.47 Although the founding of the United States of America mounted the first major challenge to this belief, there was not enough historical experience for many to truly accept the possibility of republican governments arising in Europe and Asia.
The French Revolution of 1789 changed all this. With a republican France in Europe, the possibility of a federation of republics as a means to world peace appeared to become a practical option. Even so, the first prominent proponent of such a plan was not Immanuel Kant, but the American pamphleteer Thomas Paine.
In 1791, Thomas Paine published the first volume of Rights of Man, a book intended to serve as a defense of the principles and actions of the French revolutionaries. Paine's book subsequently became a huge bestseller in America, Britain, and France.48 Although the primary focus of Rights of Man was on domestic politics, the book also discussed the implications of the French Revolution for international peace. Remarking upon Henry IV's "Grand Design" for an international federation to end war, Paine argued that the only reason the plan was not adopted was because of the prevalence of monarchical systems which stood to gain from making war. Only republican institutions would ensure the success of an international peace plan:
[W]hat we now see in the world, from the Revolutions of America and France, are a renovation of the natural order of things. . . . Monarchical sovereignty, the enemy of mankind, and the source of misery, is abolished; and sovereignty itself is restored to its natural and original place, the Nation. Were this the case throughout Europe, the cause of wars would be taken away. . . .
Why are not Republics plunged into war, but because the nature of their Government does not admit of an interest distinct from that of the Nation?49
In the second part of Rights of Man, published in 1792, Paine brought together the ideas of international federation, republican governments, and historical progress into a single, compelling vision. Appealing to liberal elements in Britain, Paine proposed the creation of a international confederation consisting of America, France, Holland, and Britain, in order to ensure peace, disarmament, and free trade:
When all the governments of Europe shall be established on the representative system, nations will become acquainted, and the animosities and prejudices fomented by the intrigue and artifice and courts, will cease. . . .
As reforms, or revolutions, call them which you please, extend themselves among nations, these nations will form connections and conventions, and when a few are thus confederated, the progress will be rapid, till despotism and corrupt government be totally expelled, at least out of two quarters of the world, Europe and America.50
A number of the American founders also felt that the French Revolution, together with the American Revolution, formed the foundation for the eventual development of a world-wide republican peace. Thomas Jefferson believed republican governments were the only reliable basis for lasting international peace, and saw a common set of foreign policy interests between America and France after the French Revolution. He firmly believed that the success of republicanism in France was essential to the safety of republicanism in North America.51
James Madison held a more cautious, though similar, opinion. In a newspaper essay published in January 1792 entitled
"Universal Peace," Madison remarked upon Rousseau's edited translation of the
Abbé St. Pierre's program for perpetual
peace. He noted that Pierre/Rousseau's scheme for peace was impractical, not the least because monarchical governments
stood to gain too much from war to abandon it. Although doubtful of the possibility of truly attaining a
perpetual peace," Madison argued that the institution of republican governments could have a positive and significant
impact on peace. If a federation for peace was possible at all, argued Madison, it was only among republican
governments such as those of the U.S. and France, in which the will of the government was the same as the will of
Initially, the revolutionary government of France itself did everything it could to encourage the hopes of eighteenth century democratic peace theorists. Shortly after gaining power, the National Assembly of France issued a resolution declaring that the "French nation renounces the initiation of war for the purposes of conquest." The French Constitution of September 1791 incorporated the resolution renouncing war in Article 6.53 Subsequent events were to present a more complex picture of the relationship between republicanism and peace.
During the first few years of the revolution, the international system appeared to be quite capable of accommodating a republican France. While there was some sympathy for the French monarch in the courts of Europe, most European monarchs were happy about the apparent collapse of the French state and had no desire use precious military resources to restore a potential enemy such as Louis XVI.54 By the summer of 1791, however, the revolution began to grow more radical and the life of the king appeared to be in danger. In response to these events, Austria and Prussia jointly issued the "Declaration of Pillnitz," calling upon the monarchs of Europe to intervene in France to restore Louis XVI to the throne. The declaration was mostly symbolic, insofar as the Declaration officially required the cooperation of all the major powers of Europe, and it was well known by all that Britain had no intention of joining such a crusade. In fact, Austria itself was not too keen to enforce the declaration. On the eve of issuing the Declaration of Pillnitz, the Austrian emperor Leopold, concerned about Austrian finances in the wake of a recent war with Turkey, ordered a reduction in the Austrian armed forces.55
Within France, the Declaration of Pillnitz received little attention initially. The National Assembly did not debate the issue, nor did most newspapers cover it. However, in the autumn of 1791, a newly elected Legislative Assembly took power which was more radical than the previous Assembly. Several pro-war factions in the Assembly, the most prominent being the Girondins, cited the Pillnitz Declaration in order to push for a preemptive war against Austria and Prussia. At first, these pro-war factions were unable to win a majority in the Assembly. However, when the increasing radicalization of the revolution seemed to threaten the political position and even personal safety of the king, Austria issued a set of ultimatums to France, which only strengthened the pro-war case.
A number of historical studies have indicated that that a chief motivation behind the Girondins' campaign for war was to resolve certain domestic political problems. The Girondins felt that a war would help to divert from economic problems, unify a divided France, and aid the consolidation of Girondin power.56 In fact, the Girondins did not even seek to hide these motivations, but publicly proclaimed them. One pro-war orator, Maximin Isnard, declared in a speech, "Rome always followed a policy more or less similar. When threatened by some domestic storm, the Senate launched a war far away from Italy, and as a result of this salutary diversion, achieved peace at home and victories abroad."57 Other reasons for war included (1) to test the French king's loyalty, which, for good reason, was suspect; and (2) to liberate the rest of Europe from the scourge of despotism. Appeals to French greatness were used to great advantage by pro-war orators.58
The rhetorical campaign by pro-war legislators was successful. France declared war on Austria on April 20, 1792. Two days previously, Austria had also made the decision to go to war against France, making a similar, but ultimately mistaken assumption, that its opponent was weak and would quickly collapse.59
After a repelling hostile incursions from the armies of Austria and Prussia, France went on the strategic offensive in Europe, declaring that it would "accord fraternity and help to all peoples who wish to recover their liberty." As part of their new military crusade for liberty, French authorities went to work in newly captured territories abolishing feudal dues, tithes, servitudes, and noble privileges. However, at the same time, people of the occupied territories were made to support French war and administrative costs through taxes, and true self-determination was thwarted by the actions of French troops and administrators.60
The geopolitical goals of France were declared by George Jacques Danton, a member of the Committee for Public Safety,
in January 1793: "The limits of France are marked out by nature. We shall reach
them at their four points; at the Ocean, at the Rhine, at the Alps, at the
Pyrenees."61 These aims were justified by references to French security and as
compensation for the expansion of Central/Eastern European powers into Poland.62 However, such goals threatened to
create a France far too powerful for Europe to tolerate.
Meanwhile, in Prussia, Immanuel Kant was observing the French Revolution with much interest and enthusiasm. Although at age sixty-five when the revolution commenced, Kant greeted the revolution with a youthful spirit and dedicated the remainder of his life to the study of politics. To Kant, the French Revolution served as a worldly confirmation of his belief that politics should be subordinate to moral principle and that the purpose of law was to secure human rights (though as an inhabitant of monarchical Prussia Kant was sometimes forced to write in a veiled and indirect manner about the benefits of republican government).63
On the other hand, it must be noted that while Kant was highly favorable to the ideals of the French Revolution, he was not at all uncritical of certain aspects of it. His firm commitment to the rule of law (domestically and internationally) led Kant to denounce all forms of rebellion as inherently unjustified. Kant believed that reform properly proceeded from the ruler downward. Nevertheless, Kant also felt that once a revolution took place, a counterrevolution was also unjustified. When the monarchical powers of Europe intervened to suppress the French Revolution, Kant criticized these actions as entirely unjustified. Ultimately, he felt that France had to work out its own destiny.64
In 1795, when Prussia dropped out of the war and signed a peace treaty with France, Kant published an essay entitled Perpetual Peace. Unlike Kant's previous works, Perpetual Peace was intended for a popular audience. In this regard, the essay was quite successful: the first edition quickly sold out, resulting in a second edition and translations into English and French.65
Perpetual Peace is written in the form of an actual draft of a treaty designed to secure peace. The treaty is divided into two sections, the first consisting of certain "preliminary articles," the second consisting of "definitive articles" of peace. The first section calls for states to obey certain basic rules of conduct, including respect for the territorial integrity of other states, the abolition of standing armies, and noninterference in the affairs of others.66 The second section of the treaty requires that states to adhere to three conditions: one, that the civic constitution of each state be republican (because popular governments will be much more reluctant to go to war than monarchies); two that the states enter into an international federation designed to secure their rights (just as individuals enter into a civil society to secure their rights); and three, that states are obligated to act in a hospitable manner to foreign individuals who travel to or through their states (Kant refers to this as the "cosmopolitan right").67
There were few original ideas in Perpetual Peace. Clearly, Kant had borrowed from the previous plans for a European federation proposed by Saint-Pierre and refined by Rousseau.68 Moreover, the notion of the peaceable nature of republics was already widely accepted. Even the title of Kant's essay was something of a cliché by 1795. Nevertheless, Kant's combination of the two ideas of federation and republicanism in a single plan for world peace could be regarded as something of a comprehensive synthesis of the most popular liberal ideals of the Enlightenment.
Kant was forced to be careful in his praise of republican institutions in Perpetual Peace -- he could not appear to be disloyal to the Prussian monarch and he especially could not appear to be loyal to a foreign country. Still, Kant's essay made a number of indirect but unmistakable references to the importance of the French Revolution as a first step in the fulfillment of his peace plan:
[I]f by good fortune one powerful and enlightened nation can form a republic (which is by its nature inclined to seek
perpetual peace), this will provide a focal point for federal association among other states. These will join up with the
first one, thus securing the freedom of each state in accordance with the idea of international right, and the whole will
gradually spread further and further by a series of alliances of this kind.69
Now, although it is true that Kant proposed a federation of republics as a means to peace, the claim that Kant was the father of the idea that "democracies do not go to war with one another" distorts Kant's views in a number of important respects. First of all, as with many other Enlightenment liberals, Kant was an advocate for republicanism rather than democracy. Kant felt that pure democracy tended to lead to majoritarian tyranny, and stressed the importance of separation of powers, the rule of law, and a franchise limited to male property owners.70 In this sense, Kant's views of the ideal form of government were significantly different from modern conceptions of democracy, in which the franchise is expected to be very wide. In fact, there were a number of governments in the eighteenth and nineteenth century which Kant would have regarded as sufficient for his Perpetual Peace plan, but which have been rejected by moderns as insufficiently democratic. For example, we know from some of Kant's unpublished writings that the particular republic he held in highest regard was France's Directory regime (1795-1799), even though the Directory restricted the franchise to a small percentage of property-owners.71 Contemporary democratic peace theorists reject the Directory regime as an oligarchic republic.72
In addition, there is an important difference between contemporary democratic peace theory and Kant's theory with regard to how peace can be attained. Contemporary democratic peace theory asserts that democracies are peaceful only toward each other, otherwise being "as aggressive and war-prone as any other form of government or society." 73 However, there is nothing in Kant's writings which suggest that republics would be peaceful only toward each other. Kant expected republics to be peaceful in general, because citizens who would have to endure the costs and destruction of war themselves would be less likely to consent to go to war.74 Kant's proposed union of republican states was based on the idea that republics had a common interest in peace with all states (not just with each other) and that this republican interest in peace was the only solid basis of an international federation.
Unfortunately, as it turned out, Kant's model of republican governance, the Directory regime, subsequently confounded his expectations by eagerly embarking upon wars with nearly all the states of Europe. To some extent, these wars could be attributed to defensive motivations, i.e., the need to acquire secure buffer zones. However, for the most part these wars were caused by the aggressive desires of the Directory to obtain loot, advance French prestige and power, and to bolster domestic legitimacy.75 Indeed, France under the Directory even engaged in aggressive wars against other republics.
In the winter of 1794-95, French armies invaded the Dutch Republic, expelling British and Prussian troops, and with the help of local liberal reformers known as the Dutch Patriots, set up the Batavian Republic. France had promised to allow the Dutch the right of political self-determination after French armies had expelled the foreign forces, and this promise was touted by welcoming Dutch Patriots. However, once France occupied the Netherlands, it played a heavy role in administering the new territory. The French conducted a systematic campaign of plunder which, together with an anti-British foreign policy and economic discrimination, impoverished the formerly wealthy republic.76
The republic of Venice became a victim of French arms in 1797, when Napoleon overran Venetian territory during his campaign in Italy. Rather than make Venice a "sister republic," as had been done in the Netherlands, France agreed with Austria to carve up the territory of the Venetian republic, with the western part going to the French empire and the eastern part, including the city of Venice itself, going to the Austrian Empire.77 According to the historian T.C.W. Blanning, "Loud and long were the cries of execration from the rest of Europe. . . . That France should make peace with Austria at the expense of the ancient republic of Venice was rightly seen as final proof that the Revolution had lost its innocence and had become just another rapacious exponent of power-politics."78
In 1798, France invaded Switzerland, with the help of French sympathizers within Switzerland, and installed a puppet government, the Helvetic Republic. Before the French intervention, Switzerland was a loose confederation of communities known as "cantons," with some cantons being essentially democratic, others aristocratic.79 The chief motivations for France's attack on Switzerland were two: first, by obtaining the Alps passages into Italy, the French could solidify their control of Italy; second, by seizing Swiss economic assets, the French could find additional funding for their war and for pressing domestic needs.80
The installation of a new government in Switzerland was an advancement for liberal-democracy in formerly aristocratic cantons. However, along with the liberal reforms of the Helvetic Republic, a centralized political system had been forcibly imposed upon a people who had long experienced local control over their political affairs. Moreover, any dissent from the Swiss regarding the wisdom and goodness of French policy was crushed. France thoroughly plundered Switzerland of much of its wealth, bringing several areas to the verge of starvation.81 A Swiss revolt against the French occupation brought a brutal retaliatory response, which included such measures as the destruction of Swiss homes and the massacre of women and children.82
Now, it is true that the Dutch Republic, Venice, and certain Swiss cantons were aristocratic republics and not fully equivalent to modern liberal-democracies. Still, in the context of the eighteenth century, these states were among the most advanced in their respect for individual rights. Both Holland and Venice were widely known and praised by Enlightenment liberals for their social tolerance and cosmopolitanism. When Enlightenment liberals spoke of the peaceful nature of republics as compared to monarchies, it was these countries that were cited explicitly or implicitly as historical examples of peaceful republics.83
In any case, relations between France and the U.S. were hardly better. Initially, there was much goodwill between the two republics. However, as the French Revolution developed in a more radical direction, and France threatened to dominate Europe with its military forces, America's favorable impressions of France declined. When the Washington administration struck a diplomatic deal with Britain at the expense of France in 1795, the French Directory became angry and turned privateers loose against American shipping.84
After the 1796 elections, in which Federalist John Adams was elected President, an incident occurred in which a French diplomatic commission demanded from American diplomats a bribe and a loan to France before negotiations could commence. The "XYZ Affair," as it came to be known, greatly angered Americans and shifted public opinion decisively against France. Riding on this wave of public outrage, the Federalists launched a naval war against France ("the Quasi-War"), built up American armed forces, and passed the Alien and Sedition Acts to repress proponents of French republicanism within the U.S.85
Aside from trade, there was considerable tension over the status of the Western territories in North America, in particular the Mississippi valley, which had been ceded by France to Spain after the Seven Years War (of which the French-Indian War in North America was a part). The new republican government in France refused to forget the humiliation of France's defeat in this previous war, and from an early date began to make plans to recover its North American territories. However, the Mississippi valley and the port of New Orleans were sensitive strategic points for the expanding U.S.
As long as Spain continued to be in official control of the Mississippi valley, most Americans were not greatly concerned, since Spain was such a weak power that it was not likely to be able to enforce its claims in the long run anyway. But the prospect that this same territory might come under the control of a major power such as France raised alarms. The Federalist administration of John Adams, after some initial hostility toward France, eventually came to the conclusion that France was too distant from North America to constitute a grave threat.86 This view was later boosted by news of the destruction of the French naval fleet by Admiral Nelson at the Battle of the Nile in November 1798. After this episode, American fears of a French occupation of the Mississippi valley disappeared. 87 By 1800, French-American relations were calm once again.
However, France's first experiment in republican governance collapsed with the fall of the Directory regime in a coup on
November 9-10, 1799. Napoleon Bonaparte, who had obtained a wide base of popular support as a result of his
successful generalship in France's wars, subsequently became dictator of France. Immanuel Kant died in 1804, just as a
new round of wars between France and the rest of Europe was beginning.
The argument that "democracies do not go to war with one another" is one of the most popular ideas of contemporary international relations theory. Immanuel Kant has been credited with originating this idea. However, Kant's Perpetual Peace essay consists largely of ideas already widely popular during the Enlightenment. Moreover, there are significant differences between the "peaceable republics" idea of Kant and today's "democratic peace" idea which have been overlooked. For Kant, a republic with a limited franchise was a perfectly acceptable form of government, even preferable to a full democracy. In addition, Kant did not argue that republics would be peaceful only toward other republics, but that they would be peaceful in general, because of the high costs of war. Kant acknowledged that republics might be forced to fight wars of self-defense against non-republican states, but he certainly did not concede that republics would end up fighting aggressive wars against other states.
As it turned out, the experience of revolutionary France seemed to discredit the entire notion that republics could be counted on to be peaceful, even in relations with fellow republics. It is true that the initial provocation to the Wars of the French Revolution was made by the monarchical regimes of Austria and Prussia. However, the provocation was eagerly sought by a large faction of French legislators, who desired a war for reasons rooted in economics, domestic legitimacy, and geopolitical ambition. Moreover, although Austria and Prussia provoked France into going to war, it was France which chose to continue and escalate the conflict into a total war for the domination of Europe.88 Several prophets of republican peace, such as Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine, found their expectations confounded by the events of the French Revolutionary Wars, and their predictions about the impact of the French Revolution on international politics became something of an embarrassment. Kant, however, endured with his political reputation substantially intact.
One reason for Kant's endurance, in contrast to other proponents of republican peace, is that Kant did not make very specific predictions in his published writings about the impact of the French Revolution, nor was he clear in his peace plan about what particular governments at the time he considered to be ideal republics. Indeed, Kant was forced to be deliberately vague in his political writings about his sympathy for the French Revolution and republicanism because of his fear of persecution by Prussian authorities. Only in his private writings and statements could he express his favorable views about the new government in France.
However, it was precisely because of these ambiguities in Kant's public position that it became easier to revive his plan at a later date, when conditions appeared to be much more favorable for another attempt to build a stable peace based on popular governments. For this purpose, it was necessary to introduce two modifications to Kant's plan. First, the requirements for domestic governance had to be raised -- no longer was it acceptable to have a republic with a narrow franchise, but rather a full democracy. This requirement excluded governments such as the French Directory regime, and thus excluded the case of the Wars of the French Revolution as evidence against the workability of a perpetual peace plan.
Second, it was necessary to qualify the claim about the inherent peacefulness of republics and/or democracies, since there were many examples of such governments committing wars of aggression in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Thus, under the new theory, perhaps democracies could not be expected to be peaceful in general, but they could be expected to be peaceful toward their own kind, since there were no historical examples of two democracies fighting one other (albeit with a handful of borderline exceptions).
These twin modifications -- raising the requirements for true self-government and proposing that peace could be attained
only between fellow democracies -- finally resulted in a new theoretical claim which did not clash with existing historical
evidence. Perhaps if Kant were alive today, he would be supportive of this new version of democratic peace theory.
However, it is an unjustified leap to conclude from his existing writings that Kant favored such a view.
One final issue which must be addressed is whether these modifications to Kant's original proposal are legitimate alterations to an idea which holds a great deal of promise or whether the changes simply amount to ad hoc arguments designed to exclude difficult historical cases.
Contemporary democratic peace theorists argue that it is perfectly legitimate to exclude cases of democracies fighting aggressive wars against non-democracies, on the grounds that the pacifying effects of democracy come into play only when democracies encounter like-minded states. Non-democracies are seen as inherently illegitimate by democratic states, but fellow democracies inspire feelings of trust and respect which result in peaceful relations. They point to the long record of peace between democracies as compelling evidence for this claim and argue that the current state of peaceful relations between democracies gives every indication of maintaining itself and expanding as democracy expands.89
Still, while the current state of peaceful relations between democracies is impressive, the claim
"democracies do not go to
war with one another" may be based on too small a sample size to be universally valid, since the number of democracies in
existence has been relatively small until the post-WWII era.90 In addition, there are a number of factors which could be
held responsible for the current peace between democracies which are not rooted in democracy per se. For example, the
immense costs of war between modern industrialized states, particularly with nuclear weapons, have made strategies of
conquest and nationalist assertion extremely risky. Trade and economic growth provide material benefits to most states
today which far outweigh any gains to be made through war. The territorial borders of states in the developed world have
become increasingly fixed over time, reducing opportunities for conflict.91 Finally, the rise of the United States to
hegemonic status has effectively stabilized the international system and ended the competition between great powers
which once took place historically even between democratic states.92 Whether peace between democracies can be
guaranteed in the event of a severe economic downturn, resource shortage, a new territorial dispute, or the rise of new
superpowers remains to be seen.
1. Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order: Zones of Peace / Zones of Turmoil (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993), p. 3.
2. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992).
3. Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace," in Kant's Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Summer 1983), pp. 323-53.
4. Most eighteenth century liberals preferred use of the term "republic" to democracy, since they were skeptical of the direct democracy of the ancient Greeks and preferred a system with a limited franchise and separation of powers as that best suited to maintaining liberty.
5. Sylvester John Hemleben, Plans for World Peace through Six Centuries (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943), pp. 1-4.
6. Ibid., pp. 21-30; Elizabeth V. Souleyman, The Vision of World Peace in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century France (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1941), pp. 1-18.
7. Hemleben, pp. 31-41, 97-100; Sully's Grand Design of Henry IV, ed. David Ogg (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1921); Souleyman, pp. 20-28.
8. William Penn, "An Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe," in The Witness of William Penn, eds. Frederick B. Tolles and E. Gordon Alderfer (New York: Octagon Books, 1980), pp. 140-59.
9. Elizabeth York, Leagues of Nations: Ancient, Mediaeval, and Modern (London: Swarthmore Press, 1919), pp. 154-78; Hemleben, pp. 56-73; Edith Wynner and Georgia Lloyd, Searchlight on Peace Plans (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1949), pp. 37-38.
10. A Project of Perpetual Peace: Rousseau's Essay, trans. Edith M. Nuttall (London: Richard Cobden-Sanderson, 1927), pp. v-ix.
11. Ibid., pp. 63-65.
12. Ibid., p. 103.
13. Ibid., pp. 129-31.
14. Wynner, pp. 40-52.
15. "No. 6: Hamilton," in The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: NAL Penguin, 1961), p. 56.
16. Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Vol. 1, trans. Thomas Nugent (New York: Hafner, 1949), pp. 120-28, 269, 272-73.
17. Thomas Paine, "Common Sense," in Political Writings, ed. Bruce Kuklick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 26.
18. Ibid., p. viii.
19. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1800 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), pp. 128, 355.
20. Forrest McDonald, E Pluribus Unum: The Formation of the American Republic, 1776-1790 (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Press, 1979), pp. 46-47; Edmund S. Morgan, The Birth of the Republic, 1763-89 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 6; Peter S. Onuf, The Origins of the Federal Republic (Philadelphi: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), pp. 1-20.
21. Frederick W. Marks III, Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973), pp. 3-15, 45-47.
22. Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union, 1781-1789 (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), pp. 220-225; Morgan, p. 117.
23. Onuf, The Origins of the Federal Republic, pp. 1-20.
24. Ibid., pp. 52-85; John Fiske, The Critical Period of American History: 1783-1789 (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1892), pp. 144-47.
25. "No. 4: Jay," in The Federalist Papers, p. 49.
26. Marks, pp. 21-36.
27. Fiske, pp. 177-84.
28. Ibid., pp. 183-86; Morris, pp. 264-65.
29. Fiske, pp. 218.
30. Quoted in Peter S. Onuf, "Anarchy and the Crisis of the Union," in To Form a More Perfect Union, ed. Herman Belz, Ronald Hoffman, and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992), p. 281.
31. Fiske, pp. 214-13.
32. Quoted in Onuf, "Anarchy and the Crisis of the Union," p. 287.
33. Quoted in ibid., pp. 282-83.
34. "No. 6: Hamilton," in The Federalist Papers, p. 56.
35. Ibid., p. 58.
36. "No. 8: Hamilton," in The Federalist Papers, pp. 66-71.
37. "No. 4: Jay," pp. 46-7; James Madison, "Universal Peace," in The Papers of James Madison, vol. 14, ed. Robert A. Rutland et al. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia), p. 207.
38. "Debates in the Virginia Convention," in The Antifederalists, ed. Cecelia M. Kenyon (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), pp. 280-81.
39. "Antifederalist No. 3," in The Antifederalist Papers, ed. Morton Borden (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1965), pp. 7-8.
40. "Anti-Federalist No. 6," in ibid., pp. 15-16.
41. "Essays by a Farmer," in The Complete Anti-Federalist, ed. Herbert J. Storing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), vol. 5, pp. 64-65.
42. "Mr. Martin's Information to the General Assembly of the State of Maryland," in The Complete Anti-Federalist, vol. 2, pp. 71-72.
43. Ibid., pp. 72.
44. Storing, The Complete Anti-Federalist, vol. 1, What the Anti-Federalists Were For, pp. 6.
45. Ibid., pp. 24-26.
46. Madison, "Universal Peace."
47. Montesquieu, Vol. 1, pp. 120-25, 138-39.
48. Samuel Edwards, Rebel!: A Biography of Tom Paine (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 121; Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 219.
49. Thomas Paine, Rights of Man (New York: Penguin, 1984), pp. 144-45.
50. Ibid., pp. 266-71.
51. Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 11-13, 45-47.
52. Madison, "Universal Peace."
53. Gunther E. Rothenberg, "The Origins, Causes, and Extension of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon," in The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 206.
54. T.C.W. Blanning, The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars (London: Longman Group, 1986), pp. 79-80.
55. Ibid., pp. 86-89.
56. Ibid., pp. 98-113; Rothenberg, p. 209.
57. Blanning, p. 106.
58. Ibid., pp. 99, 110-11
59. Ibid., pp. 116, 119.
60. William Doyle, The Oxford History of the French Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 199, 209-10, 333, 354-55.
61. Quoted in ibid., p. 200.
62. David Kaiser, Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 218-19.
63. Quoted in G. P. Gooch, Germany and the French Revolution (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1920), p. 264.
64. Ibid., pp. 265-74; Hans Reiss, ed., Kant's Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 30-33; Carl Friedrich, Inevitable Peace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), pp. 177-81.
65. W. B. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 8-9.
66. Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace" in Kant's Political Writings, pp. 93-97.
67. Ibid., pp. 98-108.
68. Gooch, p. 261.
69. "Perpetual Peace" in Kant's Political Writings, p. 104.
70. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," 101; "On the Common Saying: This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice," in Kant's Political Writings, p. 78; "The Metaphysics of Morals," in Kant's Political Writings, pp. 139-40.
71. Georg Cavallar, "Kant's Judgment on Frederick's Enlightened Absolutism," History of Political Thought, 14 (Spring 1993), pp. 105, 120.
72. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," pp. 209-212; Spencer Weart, Never At War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 305.
73. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," p. 225.
74. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," p. 100.
75. Blanning, pp. 101-113, 173-79; Kaiser, pp. 217-23.
76. William Doyle, The Oxford History of the French Revolution, pp. 209-210, 343-48.
77. Ibid., pp. 214-15.
78. Blanning, pp. 175.
79. Georg Thurer, Free and Swiss, trans. R.P. Heller and E. Long (London: Oswald Wolff, 1970), pp. 69-70.
80. Ibid., pp. 80-90; Wilhelm Oechsli, History of Switzerland, 1499-1914 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1922), pp. 302-15.
81. Oechsli, pp. 316-42; Kaiser, pp. 221-22.
82. Oechsli, pp. 330-42.
83. Paine, "Common Sense," p. 26.
84. Alexander DeConde, The Quasi-War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966), pp. 8-11; Peter T. Manicas, War and Democracy (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 156-57.
85. Manicas, pp. 157-59.
86. Tucker and Hendrickson, pp. 74-107; Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy: A History (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), p. 97.
87. Conor Cruise O'Brien, The Long Affair: Thomas Jefferson and the French Revolution, 1785-1800 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 247.
88. Rothenberg, pp. 212-19.
89. Doyle, pp. 206-17.
90. David E. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," International Security 19 (Fall 1994), pp. 50-86.
91. Evan Luard, War in International Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 90-96, 154-55, 397.
92. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981)